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Civil Action No. 94-2624
(HHG)

BRUCE H. BABBITT, et al.,

Upon consideration of defendants' motion to dismiss, the
opposition and reply thereto, the oral argument on the motion,
and the record herein; in accordance with the Opinion issued
contemporaneously herewith, it is this

& day of December,

ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss be and it is

hereby denied.

HAROLD H. GREENE
United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

E

1

PUEBLO OF SANDIA,

I

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 94-2624
(HHG)

BRUCE H. BABBITT et all,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff Pueblo of Sandia seeks review of the refusal

of the Secretary of the Interior to correct a government
survey of the Pueblo's lands.

That decision reversed the

recommendations of all but one of the many Interior
Department officials who had evaluated the Pueblo's claim
over a twelve year period and who had repeatedly assured the
Pueblo that a corrected survey was forthcoming.

In this

action, plaintiff asks the Court to declare that the act of
Congress confirming the Spanish land grant to the Pueblo
provided for an eastern boundary at the main ridge-oE-Sandia~-..-.
---<.
:

Peak; to order the Secretary of the Interior to

,..

-

corrected land survey; and to enjoin defendant Department of
Agriculture from taking any action inconsistent with the
corrected boundary.

The Secretary has moved to dismiss.
I

Backaround
The disputed claim area consists of about 10,000 acres
of rugged wilderness on the western slope of Sandia Peak
near Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The vast majority of the

disputed parcel is owned by the United States government and
is currently managed by the United States Forest Service of
the Department of Agriculture.

A small percentage of the

government-owned parcel has been developed for recreational
use, in the form of hiking trails, picnic areas, and through
a U.S. Forest Service special use permit issued to Sandia
Peak Ski Company and Sandia Peak Tram Company.

About 600

acres of the disputed claim have been transferred by the
government to private owners and developed for single-family
homes.

The Pueblo has specifically disclaimed any interest

in or claim to these private lands and interests.

The Pueblo cf Sandia has occupied its present location
since about 1300 A.D.

In 1748, the King of Spain issued a

royal grant to the Pueblo of Sandia which, in setting out
the Pueblo's boundaries, stated:

"por el Oueste La Sierra

Madre llamada de San Dla," LL,"on the east the main ridge
called Sandia."

The plaintiff alleges that this language

set the Pueblo's eastern boundary at Sandia Peak.

In the

1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States
recognized the pre-existing property rights conferred upon
the Pueblo Indians by Spain.

see S.?.niCed States v. Joseph, 94

U.S. 614, 618-19 (1877). Pursuant to the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1858 Congress officially confirmed the
1748 Spanish grant to the Pueblo and ordered a survey to be
made of the Pueblo's boundary.
The Surveyor-General, an Interior Department official,
ordered one Reuben Clements to survey the Pueblo lands
according to the boundaries specified in the royal grant
confirmed by Congress.

Clements did not survey the eastern

boundary at the crest of Sandia Peak, but at the foothills

to the west of the mountain, a difference of about 10,000
acres--theland at issue.'
The disputed claim area is of religious significance to
the people of Sandia. Their religion attaches value to
various plants, animals; and sites within the claim area.
For over a liundred years after the Clements' survey, the
people of Sandia have continued to worship at the shrines
and sacred areas within the claim area. The Sandia
religious tradition requires that this worship be both
secret-andprivate, but recently, as a result of activity by
the Forest Service in this area, it became more difficult
for the Sandia to worship in privacy.
To address these interferences with its religious
practices, the Pueblo of Sandia presented a formal claim to
the Secretary of the Interior in.1983 for a clarification of
the eastern boundary of their grant. Since then, Interior
Department officials have repeatedly taken the position that

Another survey by Reuben Clements, of the Pueblo of
Santa Ana, was labeled "suspect" and "ineptn for its
inconsistency in the location of that Pueblo's boundary.
, 844 F.2d 708, 712 (10th Cir.
1988).

the United States would correct the Pueblo boundary. After
reviewing evidence presented by a historian, Ward Alan
Minge, Ph.D.,2 the Director of the Office of Trust
Responsibility, concluded that the Clements survey was
inaccurate:

"[tlhe

boundaries, as defined by Clements in

his survey notes, deviated from the grant in almost every
respect."
report).

Amended Complaint, Exhibit E at 3 (quoting Minge
In 1986, Ross Swimmer, an Assistant Secretary of

the Interior, also endorsed the Pueblo's claim. Swimmer
reached this decision after reviewing writings of New
Mexico's state historian, Dr. Myra Ellen Jenkins.

The

Pueblo's claim was then referred to the Solicitor's Office
within the Department of the Interior.
In April 1987, the Associate Solicitor for Indian
Affairs, Timothy Vollmann, concluded in a thirteen page
opinion that:
the patent [based on the Clements survey] does not
correctly reflect the boundary provided for by the 1748
Spanish grant, nor by the report of the Surveyor-

,

At least one other federal court has relied on the
expert testimony of Dr. Minge for establishing the history
of land disputed between the United States and a Pueblo.
844 F.2d at 711.

General of Xew Mexico which was confirmed by Congress
on December 22, 1858. Thus, it is our opinion that the
Pueblo has presented a valid claim.

Amended Complaint, Exhibit F at 2-3.

As evidence that the

survey was incorrect, Vollmann cited a prior ruling
involving an error in a grant contiguous to and south of the
Pueblo of Sandia, which described the boundary as 'on the
east the Sandia Mountains."

The Court of Private Land

Claims had determined that this *grant could only have meant
that the claimants were entitled to all the land to the
crest of the Sandia Mountains."

LL at

9. Vollmann noted

that the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to
correct a surveying error had previously been exercised to
benefit another Pueblo abutting Sandia Peak, the Pueblo of
Isleta.
Interior Solicitor Ralph Tarr sent the draft opinion by
Vollmann to the General Counsel of the Department of
Agriculture for comment, noting that "my office is inclined
to adopt [the opinionln and "we intend to move expedit'iously
and finalize this opinion by April 16,"--eightdays from the
date of the letter.

at 1. In addition, Solicitor Tarr

askee the General Counsel to distribute the draft opinion
"only to the extent necessary to review it adequately.".&
However, Agriculture Department officials released the
Vollmann opinion to the press and asserted falsely that the
Pueblo sought to dispossess the private landowners from the
disputed claim area.
The result was that Tarr did not finalize the opinion
by April 16.

Instead, over a year and a half later, on

December 9, 1988, he issued an opinion reversing the opinion
of Associate Solicitor Vollmann and the recommendations of
the Assistant Secretary of Interior and of the Director of
the Office of Trust Responsibility. Tarr found the Clements
survey accurate in setting the Pueblo's boundary at the
foothills of Sandia Peak, reasoning that the Spanish
intended to grant a "formal pueblo" .'

A nfonnal pueblon was a grant of four square leagues
of land, the area within the extension of one league
measured from the Pueblo's church to the north, south, east,
and west. This so-called "customn was used in some Pueblo
grants, but frequently ignored in others. To cite but two
examples, the Spanish grant to the Acoma Pueblo was of an
area more, than five times the area of four square leagues
and the grant to the Santa Domingo Pueblo was more than four
times the area of four square leagues.

On December 13, 1988, four years later, Secretary of
the Interior Donald Hodel endorsed the Tarr opinion.
Subsequent to the election of President Clinton, Interior
Department officials repeatedly assured the Pueblo that the
new Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, intended to
withdraw the Tarr opinion. Ada Deer, the new Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs, concluded that Tarr's opinion
was invalid.

The new Solicitor of the Interior Department,

John Leshy, likewise found Tarr's opinion invalid in a
number of respects, especially Tarr's conclusion that, even
if the survey were erroneous, the Secretary of the Interior
did not have the authority to correct it. Leshy indicated
that he was not yet prepared to reverse the Tarr opinion
officially, but he informed the Pueblo that he intended to
withdraw the Tarr opinion before December 9, 1994, six years
from the date it had been issued, in order to allow the
Interior Department to complete the administrative
correction without requiring the Pueblo to risk being barred
by the six year limitations period of tEe Administrative
Procedure Act.

Bcwever, rithin days of Leshy's assurances, Secretary

Babbitt engaged in the second about-face by an interior^
Department Secretary regarding the Sandia claim.

Babbitt

apparently 'was ready" to endorse the withdrawal order but
'backed off" when "New Mexico congressmen [Senator Pete
Domenici and Representative Steven Schiffl lobbied against
it."

m

e

Tr-,

Dec. 7, 1994 ed. at 1.

The Pueblo filed this action December 7, 1994, within
six years of the date of the Tarr opinion and Hodel's
subsequent endorsement. The administrative actions under
review in this case are the refusal by Secretary Hodel to
order a corrected survey of the boundary and the subsequent
decision of Secretary Babbitt to adhere to Hodel's decision.

II

of RevDefendants have moved to dismiss this action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(l), and for failure to state a claim for relief,

pursuant to Fed.~.Civ.~.
12(b) (6). In reviewing a motion to

dismiss, a Court must of course presume the factual
allegations of the complaint as true, and on a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(6), the Court must draw all
inferences in plaintiff's favor. Doe v. U.S. DeparJustice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

However,

even under a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b) (11, the burden is
v.

on the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction.
of the

n,
656 F.Supp.

1034, 1037 (D.D.C.

1987) (citing JWOS. U. v . Assdated Pregg, 299 U.S. 269
(1936)).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule

12 (b)(1), " [tlhe factual allegations of the complaint thus
will bear closer scrutiny than under a Rule l2(b) (6) motion,
and the Court may consider material outside the pleadings,"

-,

656 F.Supp. at 1037, without converting the motion

to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.

m

m

, 835 F.2d

See

u,

902, 905-06 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

The Court now applies these principles to the motion to
dismiss.
111

Quiet T i t k A c L

The government argues that there are several
interrelated bars to the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction, all revolving around the claim of sovereign
immunity. More specifically, the government asserts that,
inasmuch as the action here allegedly is one to divest it of
ownership of land, it is barred directly by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Alternatively, the argument is that,
inasmuch as the statute of limitations under the Quiet Title
Act, 28 U.S.C. 5 2 4 0 9 , is twelve years and the action here
was not brought until much later, there again, the requisite
consent of the sovereign is missing, and the suit may not be
entertained by the Court.

The basic problem with these

contentions is that the action before the Court is not one
contesting the government's ownership of the land in
question, and it therefore should not be judged under the
Quiet Title Act.
In a similar claim brought by another Pueblo, this

Court rejected arguments similar to those advanced by the
government here.
(D.D.C.

1979).

In

of Taos v. Andrus, 4 7 5 F.Supp. 3 5 9

m,as in this case, the Pueblo sought

correction of a boundary between lands held by the Forest
Service and the Pueblo; the Pueblo asserted that the
boundary was the subject of an erroneous survey conducted in
the nineteenth century by a government surveyor; the
Department of Interior initially concluded that the Pueblo
claim was valid and that a corrected survey would be
ordered; and, after political opposition from the Department
of Agriculture, the Interior Department retreated from that
position and refused to correct the survey. The Court
concluded that:
This is a classic case seeking review of administrative
action, and sovereign immunity is thus no bar to the
action. Cases cited by defendant for the proposition
that actions which affect government ownership of land
are barred by sovereign immunity are inapposite. The
relief requested in this case affects no ownership
interest; it would merely adjust the boundaries between
two parcels of government-owned land.

...

X

at

364-65,

(citations omitted).'

There is one difference between this case and m,
but it is not a sufficient distinction to cause a grant of
the motion to dismiss. In m, the administrative action
under review was the opinion of the Attorney General
suspending the correction of a resurvey. Here, the
administrative action under review is the \\actwof refusing
to order a corrected survey--a rejection of the reports and
recommendations of all of the Interior Department officials
who evaluated the claim prior to the media's attention.
12

For sirniisr reascns, the twelve year scatute of
limitations of the Quiet Title Act does not bar this suit
because, as stated above, this is not a suit to quiet title.
As indicated by the relief sought in the amended complaint,*
the Pueblo does not seek title to the disputed claim area;
title would-remain in the United States government. The
Pueblo seeks merely to have the property at issue
transferred from the control of one federal agency, the
Department of Agriculture, to another, the Department of
Interior, which, unlike Agriculture, would manage the
property in trust for the Pueblo Indian~.~

The Pueblo's amended complaint--seekinga corrected
survey and a declaration that the corrected boundary is the
true boundary--of course supersedes the original complaint
and therefore controls the dispute over the nature of this
action: "A pleading that has been amended under Rule 15(a)
Once an amended
supersedes the pleading it modifies.
pleading is interposed, the original pleading no longer
performs any function in the case and any subsequent motion
made by an opposing party should be directed at the amended
pleading." CHARLES A. WRIGHT et dl., 4 IZeckral P r a c t i c d

...

Procedure

1 1476 (1990).

As indicated above, the Pueblo does not seek any
rights to the property held by private landowners within the
disputed claim area.
13

...-;x~rnrneiit notes that title to the land is
a

currently held by the Pueblo, not by the federal government
in trust for the tribe, but while this is true it is also
misleading. As articulated in the leading treatise on
federal Indian law,
[tlhe precise title granted to the tribe makes little
difference since, absent contrary congressional action,
the restrictions on alienation and other unique
attributes of Indian trust land apply equally to lands
held in trust for the tribes by the United States and
to lands held in fee title by tribes with which the
federal government maintains a trust relationship.
ook of F
e
d
(1982 ed.)

480 n. 73

.

In general, title to Indian reservation land is held by
the federal government in trust for the tribe.

The status

of the Pueblo Indians is unique: because of the confirmation
of Spanish grants by Congress, the Sandia and some other
Pueblo tribes technically hold title to their land.
However, the Sandia Pueblo does not hold "title" in the
traditional sense of fee simple absolute. This land is
significantly encumbered by the requirement that the Pueblos
may not convey property without the consent of the Secretary

-

of the Interlor. Mountain States lel.

-,

&

Tel. v. Pueblo of

472 U.S. 237 (1985) (construing Pueblo Lands Act

of 1924). Moreover, the special trust responsibility
applies to the New Mexico Pueblos with equal validity as to
reservation Indians. F
e
l
i
xof F e d a

Indian Law5 (1982 ed. )

.

Supreme Court decisions since Tasm relied upon by the
government have not limited this Court's jurisdiction to
review the Secretary's refusal to correct an erroneous
survey of the boundary between United States land and an
Indian reservation. Cases the government cites for the
proposition that this action is barred by the QTA (Uock vL
m t h D

-,

m

, 461 U.S. 273 (1983) and pnited States v,

476 U.S. 834 (1986)) are inapposite.
In Block, the Supreme Court held North Dakota's attempt

to prevent the United States from "develop[ingl or otherwise
exercising privileges of ownership upon the bed of the
Little Missouri River," 461 U.S. at 278 (quoting complaint),
subject to the Quiet Title Act.

Had this attempt succeeded,

North Dakota would have had the right to bar the United

States fron every vaiuable right of ownership in the
riverbed, such as dredging and development. By contrast, as
explained above, the Pueblo of Sandia has not sought to
prevent the Department of Interior from developing the land,
or exercising other property rights in the Sandia Peak
region.

In fact, the correction of the Pueblo's eastern

boundary does not challenge the government's title to the
disputed lands and "any challenge to a non-ownership
interest in real property is not precluded by the QTA."
r Corn. v.

m,905 F.2d 754, 759

Similarly in

m,a private

divest the United States of title.

(4th Cir. 1990).

individual sought to
Plaintiff's claim arose

from the gove.rnmentis1905 allotment of Indian reservation
land pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat.
388, as amended 25 U.S.C. 5 331 (1982).

Mottaz challenged

the government's sale of her ancestor's allotted land to the
United States Forest Service. As the Court noted:

"What

respondent seeks is a declaration that she alone possesses
valid title to her interests in the allotments and that the
title asserted by the United States is defective.

.

. ." 476

U.S. at 3 4 2 .

Unlike

ln

Mottaz, the Pueblo of Sandia has not

sought title in its amended complaint, nor has it any time
asserted that the United States' title is defective.
Decisions interpreting Block and Mottaz further support
the proposition that the Quiet Title Act does not govern
claims which do not seek to divest the government of title.
See. e.a.. NavaCir. 1987).

v. New Me-,

809 F.2d 1455 (10th

There the Navajo tribe sued to reclaim title to

unallotted Navajo reservation land which had been given to
the state of New Mexico and to private landowners pursuant
to executive orders providing that any unallotted lands be
returned to the public domain. The government's reliance on
this precedent for the proposition that the Navajosf claim
was time-barred under the QTA is undercut by the court's
clear admonition that, '[ilf

the Tribe wishes to pursue

continued reservation status, as opposed to title, of the
subject lands, it is not precluded from filing a declaratory
judgment action to determine its reservation boundary lines.

. - .

809 F.2d at

1475,

n. 29. The Court of Appeals for

this Circuit has also recognized that an action to clarify

reservatio?. Soundaries is distinct from k quiet title

action, and is therefore not barred by the statute of
limitations in the QTA.

Interior, 820 F.2d

441, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

IV

The government's alternative argument that this action
is barred by the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA) is
likewise in error. The ICCA bars claims against the
government existing as of 1946.

However, as explained

above, the Pueblo's claim seeks to review administrative
actions taken decades after the ICCA's cut-off date.
wba
e-1

of So-1na

F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 19931, ,
-

v. U n e 4

In

S,-

982

113 S.Ct. 2995

(1993), the state of South Carolina, in violation of the

Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. I 177 (1992), purchased the
Catawba Tribe's ancestral lands in 1840 for $16,000 and a
promise that the State would give the tribe a new
reservation. In the 19508, pursuant to the Termination Act,
25 U.S.C. 5 935 (1992), Congress terminated the trustee

re1aticr:his

with the Catawba tribe. The tribe alleged that

it was assured by the government that termination would not
affect the tribe's rights to its historic land claim.

The

Federal Circuit held that the claims based on the
government's historical failure to restore the ancestral
land to the.tribe were barred, but that the post-1946 claims
based on the government's misrepreaentations concerning the
effect of the Termination Act were not:
While all seven claims may stem at some general level
from the allegation of a unitary disregard by the
Government for the Tribe's land claim, this is not
enough to have brought claims 3-7 under ICC
jurisdiction.

.

...

. . the Government
err[s] in equating the
Government's passive failure to act to restore the land
with the Government's alleged active representations
that the Termination Act, effective in 1962, would not
affect the Tribe's historic claim to the land.
L L at 1569. Similarly, in this-case,although the Pueblo's
claim "stems" in some sense from inaccuracies in Clements'
survey, that official's failure correctly to survey the
Sandia Pueblo cannot be equated with the refusal of
Secretaries Hodel and Babbitt to order a corrected survey,
which is what plaintiff is challenging. Such an action

would

not

be iz a,zcordance with law nor would it be fair on

any view of the controversy

This Court has jurisdiction to review the refusal of
the Secretary of the Interior to correct an inaccurate
survey of public lands.

Despite the government's attempts

to characterize this action as a suit to quiet title or to
redress a nineteenth century land claim, what the Pueblo
really seeks is judicial review of adverse agency action.
This suit is therefore properly governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 1 702 (1992),
which operates as a waiver of sovereign immunity in a suit
seeking relief other than money damages:
An action in a court of the United States seeking
relief other than money damages and stating a claim
that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted
or failed to act in an official capacity or under color
of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief
therein denied on the ground that it is against the
United States.

T>.o fasts a l l e j ~ din the Pueblo's amended complaint set

forth such a claim under the APA.

Specifically, the Pueblo

claims that Secretary Hodel and Secretary Babbitt had a duty
to correct an erroneous survey of Indian land, and that they
violated that duty.

The Secretary of the Interior has

supervisory-authorityover all public lands,

43

U.S.C.

§

2

(1992), including the authority to survey Indian lands, 25

U.S.C.

§

176 (1992); to establish the boundaries of national

forests, 16 U.S.C.

§

488 (1992); to correct erroneous land

surveys, 4 3 U.S.C. 1 772 (1992); and to correct patents of
conveyances to eliminate such errors,

43

(1992). As this Court concluded in -10

U.S.C.

§

176

of Taos, the

Secretary of the Interior has "authority to correct what
might even be characterized as gross errors in boundaries
between public lands.'

475

F. Supp. at 366.

There is accordingly no question that Secretaries Hodel
and Babbitt had the authority to order a corrected survey.
The more difficult question is whether they had a &&y to do
so.

43

U.S.C. 5 772 places the decision to order a

corrected survey within the discretion of the Secretary of

the Interior: "The Secretary of the Interior may

. . .

his discretion, cause to be made, as he may deem wise

in

. .

..

such resurveys or retracements of the surveys of public
lands as, after full investigation, he may deem essential to
properly mark the boundaries of the public lands.

.- .

I

Thegovernment argues from this statutory provision that the
administrative action in question is presumptively
unreviewable because it is agency action "committed to
agency discretion by law.'

5

U.S.C. 5 701 (a)(2) (1992).

However, the Court notes two grounds for the reviewability
of this claim under the APA.
First, as the government itself conceded at the hearing
on the motion to dismiss, under some circumstances a failure
to order a corrected survey could constitute an abuse of
discretion--whichwould be judicially reviewable. Where the
facts alleged in plaintiff's amended complaint indicate that
political

from two members of the legislative

branch may have been the sole reason for the refusal of
Hodel and Babbitt to order a corrected survey, plaintiff
Sandia has stated a colorable claim under the APA that Hodel

and Eabbitt dbused : h e i r

discretion in not ordering a

corrected survey.
In the alternative, the Court concludes that plaintiff
has stated a colorable claim under the APA that Secretaries
Hodel and Babbitt not only had the authority, but the duty
to correct an erroneous survey, because the rights of Native

Americans are at stake.

In the context of the special

relationship between the federal government and the Indian
peoples, the United States cannot in this context ignore its
fiduciary duties toward Indian tribes. See. e.a.. People of
lted States, 470 F.Supp.

423,

428

(D.D.C. 1 9 7 9 ) .

The Supreme Court has "previously emphasized 'the
distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the
Government in its dealings with these dependent and
sometimes exploited people. '"s U.S.

206,

225

v. M i t c h e l l ,

(1983) (citation omitted)

.

463

The trust

relationship between the government and a tribe or pueblo
is obviously one of full fiduciary responsibility, not
solely of traditional market-place morals. When the
Federal Government undertakes an 'obligation of trust'
toward an Indian tribe or group
the obligation is
'of the highest responsibility and trust,' not that of
'a mere contracting party'

. ..
. ...

D i n t Tribal Council of the Passanaguoddv Tribe v. Morton,
388 F. Supp. 649, 662 (D. Me.), U ,
528 F.2d 370 (1st

Cir. 1975) (citation omitted).'
If the Secretary of the Interior's failure to order a

new survey is let stand, the

would benefit from a

aOYernment error in a crovernment survey--surelya violation
of a trustee's responsibility toward its beneficiary.

The

Court is persuaded, as plaintiff has argued, that the
fiduciary duty is most compelling where, as here, the
adverse party to the claims of a tribe is the government
itself.
In an analogous situation, where the government failed
to advise a tribe of the additional value of its property
after helium had been discovered on the land, and the
government subsequently sanctioned a transfer of the land
from a private party to the government without allowing the
tribe to renegotiate for a higher rent, the Court of Claims

' As

indicated above, although some pueblos hold title
to some land, that land is subject to similar restrictions
on-alienationas other lands held in trust by the United
States for Indian tribes. Therefore, the federal trust
relationship applies equally to pueblos.

found ~ b . e s e 3ctisns "irere not consistent with the
government's duty to the Navajos."

Bvaio Tribe v. Unit&

States, 364 F . 2 d 320, 323-24 (Ct. C1. 1966).

emphasized that '[slince

The court

the Department of the Interior had

an obligation to safeguard the property of the Navajos when
they were dealing with third parties, it is clear that an
even greater duty existed when the Department itself entered
into transactions with the Indians."

2.L at 322-23.

In sum, the Pueblo's complaint states a colorable claim
under the APA that Secretary Hodel and Secretary Babbitt
violated their duty to correct the Clements survey.

To be

sure, the APA itself is not a basis for jurisdiction.
430 U.S. 99 (1977). But the Pueblo's

v. ,
S

complaint clearly references general federal question
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.

§

1331; the special jurisdiction

over claims by an Indian tribe arising under federal laws
and treaties, 28 U.S.C.
statute, 28 U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§

§§

§

1362; the declaratory judgment

2201-02; and the mandamus statute, 28

1361.. As the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has

noted, "[ulnder settled law, for claims permitted under the

APA's waiver of sovereign immunity, jurisdiction is proper

-

in the federal district court under the federal-question
statute, the declaratory-judgment statute, the declaratoryjudgment statute, or the mandamus statute."

. . 967
9
,
F.2d 598, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

This

suit is not barred on the technical ground that the amended
complaint did not refer to the APA in the jurisdictional
sections; as indicated above, the APA is not itself a basis
for jurisdiction. Moreover, the facts alleged in the
amended complaint, on their face, indicate that the Pueblo
is seeking review of administrative action.
Accordingly, because this action is governed by the
APA, not the Quiet Title Act or the Indian Claims Commission
Act, a six year statute of limitations determines the
timeliness of this action.

28 U.S.C.

§

2401(a).

This suit

is timely, as it was brought within the APA's six year
limitations period.

The Pueblo's claim arose on December

13, 1988, when Secretary Hodel endorsed Solicitor Tarr's

opinion reversing all of the previous opinions which had

concluded that a corrected survey was'merited. The Pueblo

of Sandia has sufficiently established the timeliness of its
claim: Secretary Hodel's refusal to order a corrected survey
and Secretary Babbitt's like refusal occurred less that six
years prior to the filing of the Pueblo's original
complaint.
~ c c o r d i n ~ lthe
~ , governmenttsmotion to dismiss is
DENIED.

HAROLD H. GREENE

United States District Judge

